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Abstract
We provide elementary and uniform proofs of order independence for
various strategy elimination procedures for finite strategic games, both
for dominance by pure and by mixed strategies. The proofs follow the
same pattern and focus on the structural properties of the dominance
relations. They rely on Newman’s Lemma (see Newman [1942]) and
related results on the abstract reduction systems.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
To properly discuss the background for this research we need to recall a number
of concepts commonly used in the study of strategic games. We follow here a
standard terminology of the game theory, see, e.g., Myerson [1991] or Osborne
and Rubinstein [1994]. We stress the fact that we deal here only with finite
games. Given n players we represent a strategic game by a sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn),
where for each i ∈ [1..n]
• Si is the finite, non-empty, set of strategies (sometimes called pure
strategies) available to player i,
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so
pi : S1 × . . .× Sn→R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
We assume that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j.
Given a sequence of non-empty sets of strategies S1, . . ., Sn and s ∈ S1 ×
. . .× Sn we denote the ith element of s by si and use the following standard
notation:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
• (s′i, s−i) := (s1, . . ., si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . ., sn), where we assume that s
′
i ∈ Si.
In particular (si, s−i) = s,
• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn,
• (S ′i, S−i) := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × S
′
i × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly with some superscripts.
Next, given a game G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and non-empty sets of
strategies S ′1, S
′′
1 , . . ., S
′
n, S
′′
n such that S
′
i ⊆ Si and S
′′
i ⊆ Si for i ∈ [1..n] we
say that G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn) and G
′′ := (S ′′1 , . . ., S
′′
n, p1, . . ., pn) are re-
strictions1 of G and denote by G′ ∩ G′′ the restriction (S ′1 ∩ S
′′
1 , . . ., S
′
n ∩
1Sometimes the name reduction is used. In Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] a restriction
is called a subgame.
S ′′n, p1, . . ., pn). In each case we identify each payoff function pi with its restric-
tion to the Cartesian product of the new strategy sets.
Fix a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn). We now introduce a number of well-
known binary dominance relations on strategies. We say that a strategy si is
weakly (strictly) dominated by a strategy s′i, or equivalently, a strategy s
′
i
weakly (strictly) dominates a strategy si, if
pi(si, s−i) ≤ pi(s
′
i, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i, with some inequality (all inequalities) being strict. We denote
the weak dominance relation by W and the strict dominance relation by S.
Further, we say that the strategies si and s
′
i of player i are compatible if
for all j ∈ [1..n] and s−i ∈ S−i
pi(si, s−i) = pi(s
′
i, s−i) implies pj(si, s−i) = pj(s
′
i, s−i).
We then say that si is nicely weakly dominated by s
′
i if si is weakly dom-
inated by s′i and si and s
′
i are compatible. This notion of dominance, that we
denote by NW, was introduced in Marx and Swinkels [1997].
Finally, recall that two strategies si and s
′
i of player i are called payoff
equivalent if
pj(si, s−i) = pj(s
′
i, s−i)
for all j ∈ [1..n] and all s−i ∈ S−i. We denote this binary relation on the
strategies by PE.
These notions have natural counterparts for mixed strategies that will be
introduced later in the paper.
Each binary dominance relation R, so in particular W, S, NW or PE, in-
duces the following binary relation on strategic gamesG := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn)
and G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn):
G⇒RG
′ iff G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n] each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is
R-dominated in G by some s′i ∈ S
′
i.
If all iterations of ⇒R starting in an initial game G yield the same final
outcome, we say that R is order independent .
1.2 Background
In the literature on dominance relations in finite strategic games several order
independence results were established, to wit:
• Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] and Stegeman [1990] proved it for strict
dominance by pure strategies,
• Bo¨rgers [1990,1993] established it for his notion of (unary) dominance,
• Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] proved it for strict dominance by mixed
strategies,
• Marx and Swinkels [1997,2000]) proved it for nice weak dominance up to
the addition or removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a renaming
of strategies.
This implies the same form of order independence for weak dominance by
pure strategies for the games (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) satisfying the follow-
ing transference of decisionmaker indifference (TDI) condition:
for all i, j ∈ [1..n], ri, ti ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i
pi(ri, s−i) = pi(ti, s−i) implies pj(ri, s−i) = pj(ti, s−i).
Informally, this condition states that whenever for player i two of its
strategies ri and ti are indifferent w.r.t. some joint strategy s−i of the
other players, then ri and ti are also indifferent w.r.t. s−i for all players.
They also established analogous results for nice weak dominance and
weak dominance by mixed strategies.
These results were established by different methods and techniques. In
particular, the proof of order independence given in Bo¨rgers [1990] proceeds
through a connection between the rationalizability notion of Pearce [1984] and
the survival of a strategy under the iterated dominance. In turn, the original
proof of order independence for strict dominance by mixed strategies given in
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, pages 61-62] involves in an analogous way a
modification of the rationalizability notion and relies on the existence of Nash
equilibrium for strictly competitive games.
It is useful to point out that the assumption that the games are finite
is crucial. In fact, in an interesting paper Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002]
showed that in case of infinite games order independence for strict dominance
does not hold. They also provided natural conditions under which the unique
outcome is guaranteed.
1.3 Motivation
In this paper we provide uniform and elementary proofs of the abovementioned
and related order independence results. The table in Figure 1 should clarify the
scope of the paper. So we deal both with unary and binary dominance relations
and with pure and mixed strategies. While binary dominance relations, such
as the ones introduced in the previous subsection, are more known, the unary
ones, introduced in Bo¨rgers [1990,1993], allow us to characterize a specific form
of the rational strategies.
dominance \ strategies pure mixed
unary
binary
Figure 1: Classification of the order independence results
Further, we also consider combinations of binary dominance relations, both
for pure and for mixed strategies.
Having in mind such a plethora of possibilities it is difficult to expect a
single ‘master result’ that would imply all the discussed order independence
results. Still, as we show, it is possible to provide uniform proofs of these
results based on the same principles. Notably, our presentation focuses on
so-called abstract reduction systems (see, e.g., Terese [2003]) in particular on
Newman’s Lemma (see Newman [1942]) and some of its natural refinements.
Newman’s Lemma offers a simple but highly effective and versatile tool
for proving order independence results. We discuss it and its consequences in
detail in the next section and later, in Section 7. Let us just mention here
that it deals with the properties of a binary relation → on an arbitrary set
A. Below →∗ denotes the transitive reflexive closure of → . We say that →
is weakly confluent if for all a, b, c ∈ A
a
ւ ց
b c
implies that for some d ∈ A
b c
ց∗ ∗ ւ
d
Then Newman’s lemma simply states that whenever
• no infinite → sequences exist,
• → is weakly confluent,
then for each element a ∈ A all → sequences starting in a have a unique ‘end
outcome’.
It turns out that to prove order independence of a (binary or unary) dom-
inance relation R it suffices to establish weak confluence of the corresponding
reduction relation ⇒R and apply Newman’s lemma. In fact, since only finite
games are considered, no infinite ⇒R sequences exist.
To deal with combinations of two dominance relations, in particular the
combination of nice weak dominance NW and payoff equivalence PE, a rela-
tivized version of Newman’s lemma is helpful, where one only claims unique
‘end outcome’ up to an equivalence relation. In the game-theoretic setting
this equivalence relation is an ‘equivalence up to strategy renaming’ relation
on strategic games.
Further, the following notion involving a relative dependence between two
binary relations → 1 and → 2 on some set A turns out to be useful. We say
that →1 left commutes with →2 if
→1 ◦ →2 ⊆ →2 ◦ →
∗
1 ,
i.e., if for all a, b, c ∈ A a→1 b→2 c implies that for some d ∈ A a→2 d→
∗
1 c.
Now, one can prove that ⇒PE left commutes with ⇒NW . This allows us
to ‘push’ the removal of the payoff equivalent strategies to the ‘end’ and prove
a ‘structured’ form of the order independence of NW combined with PE, a
result originally established in Marx and Swinkels [1997].
Our presentation is also influenced by Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] where
order independence for strict dominance was proved by establishing this result
first for arbitrary (binary) dominance relations that are strict partial orders
and hereditary.
In our approach we isolate other useful properties of dominance relations,
both for the case of pure and mixed strategies. In particular, we identify
conditions that allow us to conclude order independence up to a renaming
of strategies for a combination of two reduction relations. This allows us to
identify the relevant properties of nice weak dominance that lead to the results
of Marx and Swinkels [1997].
Of course, each strategy elimination procedure needs to be motivated, ei-
ther by clarifying the reasoning used by the players or by clarifying its effect
on the structure of the game, for example on its set of Nash equilibria. In our
exposition we ignore these issues since we focus on the dominance relations
and the entailed elimination procedures that were introduced and motivated
in the cited references.
1.4 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss Newman’s
lemma. Then in Section 3, following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990], we set the
stage by discussing (binary) dominance relations for strategic games and their
natural properties, in particular hereditarity. Intuitively, a dominance relation
is hereditary if it is inherited from a game to any restriction. Some domi-
nance relations are hereditary, while others not. Usually, for non-hereditary
dominance relations order independence does not hold.
Then, in Section 4, we generalize the approach of Bo¨rgers [1990,1993] to
deal with arbitrary non-hereditary dominance relations. Informally, each such
binary dominance relation R can be modified to a unary dominance relation
for which under some natural assumption both entailed reduction relations
→inh−R and ⇒inh−R are order independent.
Next, in Section 5 we study dominance relations where the dominating
strategies are mixed. We mimic here the development of Section 3 by identify-
ing natural properties and establishing a general result on order independence.
We apply then these results to show order independence for strict dominance
by mixed strategies. In Section 6 we generalize the approach of Section 4 to
the case when the dominating strategies are mixed.
To prepare the ground for results involving game equivalence we discuss in
Section 7 a modification of Newman’s Lemma in presence of an equivalence
relation. Then in Section 8 we resume the discussion of dominance relations
by focusing on the payoff equivalence. For this dominance relation order inde-
pendence does not hold, but order independence up to a renaming of strategies
does hold. Analogous results hold in case of equivalence to a mixed strategy
and are discussed in Section 9.
Then in Section 10 we study conditions under which order dominance up to
a renaming of strategies can be proved for a combination of two dominance re-
lations. Such a combination is useful to study when one of these two relations
is not hereditary. Then in Section 11 we apply the obtained general result
to get a simple and informative proof of a result of Marx and Swinkels [1997]
that nice weak dominance is order independent up to the removal of the payoff
equivalent strategies and a renaming of strategies. In the next two Sections,
12 and 13, we mimic these developments for the case of equivalence to and
dominance by a mixed strategy. Finally, in the concluding section we summa-
rize the results in a tabular form and explain why each of the discussed order
independence results has to be established separately.
2 Abstract Reduction Systems
We provide first completely general results concerning abstract reduction sys-
tems. An abstract reduction system , see, e.g., Huet [1980], (and Terese
[2003] for a more recent account, where a slightly different terminology is used)
is a pair (A, → ) where A is a set and → is a binary relation (a reduction)
on A. Let →+ denote the transitive closure of → and →∗ the transitive
reflexive closure of → . So in particular, if a = b, then a→∗ b. Further, a→ǫb
means a = b or a→ b.
• We say that b is a → -normal form of a if a→∗ b and no c exists such
that b→ c, and omit the reference to → if it is clear from the context.
If every element of A has a unique normal form, we say that (A, → )
(or just → if A is clear from the context) satisfies the unique normal
form property . 2
• We say that → is weakly confluent if for all a, b, c ∈ A
a
ւ ց
b c
implies that for some d ∈ A
b c
ց∗ ∗ ւ
d
• Following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] we say that → is one step
closed if for all a ∈ A some a′ ∈ A exists such that
2We stress the fact that this notion of a normal form, standard in the theory of abstract
reduction systems, has no relation whatsoever to the notion of a game in normal form,
another name used for strategic games. In particular, the reader should bear in mind that
later we shall consider strategic games that are normal forms of specific reduction relations
on strategic games.
– a→ǫa′,
– if a→ b, then b→ǫa′.
In all proofs of weak confluence given in the paper we shall actually estab-
lish that for some d ∈ A we have b→ǫd and c→ǫd.
In the sequel, as already mentioned, we shall repeatedly rely upon the
following lemma established in Newman [1942].
Lemma 2.1 (Newman) Consider an abstract reduction system (A, → ) such
that
• no infinite → sequences exist,
• → is weakly confluent.
Then → satisfies the unique normal form property.
Proof. (Taken from Terese [2003, page 15].)
By the first assumption every element of A has a normal form. To prove
uniqueness, call an element a ambiguous if it has at least two different normal
forms. We show that for every ambiguous a some ambiguous b exists such that
a→ b. This proves absence of ambiguous elements by the first assumption.
So suppose that some element a has two distinct normal forms n1 and n2.
Then for some b, c we have a→ b→∗ n1 and a→ c→
∗ n2. By weak confluence
some d exists such that b→∗ d and c→∗ d. Let n3 be a normal form of d. It
is also a normal form of b and of c. Moreover n3 6= n1 or n3 6= n2. If n3 6= n1,
then b is ambiguous and a→ b. And if n3 6= n2, then c is ambiguous and
a→ c. ✷
Note that if → is not irreflexive, then the first condition is violated. So
this lemma can be applicable only to the relations → that are irreflexive.
All reduction relations on games here considered are by definition irreflexive.
Moreover, because the games are assumed to be finite, these reduction relations
automatically satisfy the first condition of Newman’s lemma.
Also, the following simple observation will be helpful.
Note 2.2 (Unique Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction systems
(A, →1 ) and (A, →2 ) such that
• →1 satisfies the unique normal form property,
• →+1 = →
+
2 .
Then →2 satisfies the unique normal form property. ✷
In the remainder of the paper we shall study abstract reduction systems
that consist of the set of all restrictions of a game and a reduction relation
on them. Since we limit ourselves to finite games, in such abstract reduction
systems (A, → ) no infinite → sequences exist.
In this context there are three natural ways of establishing that (A, → )
satisfies the unique normal form property:
• by showing that → is one step closed: this directly implies weak con-
fluence, and then Newman’s Lemma can be applied;
• by showing that → is weakly confluent and applying Newman’s Lemma;
• by finding a ‘more elementary’ reduction relation →1 such that
– no infinite →1 sequences exist,
– →1 is weakly confluent,
– →+1 = →
+,
and applying Newman’s Lemma and the Unique Normal Form Note 2.2.
For some reduction relations all three results are equally easy to establish,
while for some others only one.
3 Dominance Relations
We now study (binary) dominance relations in full generality. A dominance
relation is a function that assigns to each game G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn)
a subset RG of
⋃n
i=1(Si × Si). Instead of writing that si RG s
′
i holds we write
that si R s
′
i holds for G. We say then that si is R-dominated by s
′
i in G
or that that s′i R-dominates si in G. When G is clear from the context we
drop a reference to it and view a dominance relation as a binary relation on
the strategies of G.
Given a dominance relation R we introduce two notions of reduction be-
tween a game G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and its restriction G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n,
p1, . . ., pn).
• We write G→RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G by some s
′
i ∈ Si.
• We write G⇒RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G by some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i.
So the relations →R and ⇒R differ in just one symbol (spot the difference).
Namely, in the case of →R we require that each strategy removed from Si is
R-dominated in G by a strategy in Si, while in case of ⇒R we require that
each strategy removed from Si is R-dominated in G by a strategy in S
′
i. So
in the latter case the dominating strategy should not be removed at the same
time.
In the literature both reduction relations were considered. In our subse-
quent presentation we shall focus on the second one, ⇒R, since
• for most of the reduction relations studied here →R and ⇒R coincide,
• for payoff equivalence these relations do not coincide and only the second
reduction relation is meaningful.
On the other hand, the first reduction relation, →R, allows us to define
the ‘maximal’ elimination strategy according to which in each round all R-
dominated strategies are deleted. Such a natural strategy is in particular of
interest when order independence fails, see, e.g., Gilli [2002].
Further, note when G→RG
′, the game G′ can be ‘degenerated’ in the
sense that some of the strategy sets of G′ can be empty. However, this cannot
happen when →R and ⇒R coincide, since then G⇒RG
′ implies that G′ is
not ‘degenerated’.
Finally, let us mention that for various type of dominance relations R
(unary or binary, for pure and mixed strategies) studied here the equivalence
between the corresponding →R and ⇒R reduction relations plays a crucial
role in the proofs of the order independence results.
So each reduction relation has some advantages and it is natural to intro-
duce both of them.
Recall that a strict partial order is an irreflexive transitive relation. We say
now that a dominance relation R is a strict partial order if for each game
G the binary relation RG is a strict partial order and reuse in a similar way
other typical properties of binary relations. The following observation clarifies
the first item above and will be needed later.
Lemma 3.1 (Equivalence) If a dominance relation R is a strict partial or-
der, then the relations →R and ⇒R coincide.
Proof. It suffices to show that if G→RG
′, then G⇒RG
′.
Let G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn). Suppose
that some si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G by some s
′
i ∈ Si. Since R is a
strict partial order and Si is finite, a strategy s
′
i ∈ Si exists that R-dominates
si in G and is not R-dominated in G. So this s
′
i is not eliminated in the step
G→RG
′ and consequently si is R-dominated in G by some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i. ✷
In what follows we establish a general ‘order independence’ result for the
reduction relation ⇒R for the dominance relations R that are strict partial
orders and satisfy the following natural assumption due to Gilboa, Kalai and
Zemel [1990]. We say that a dominance relation R is hereditary if for every
game G, its restriction G′ and two strategies si and s
′
i of G
′
si is R-dominated by s
′
i in G implies si is R-dominated by s
′
i in G
′.
Each reduction relation ⇒R can be specialized by stipulating that a single
strategy is removed. We denote the corresponding reduction relation by ⇒1,R.
A natural question when the reduction relation ⇒R can be modeled using the
iterated application of the ⇒1,R reduction relation does not turn out to be
interesting.
In fact, for most dominance relations that are of importance such a model-
ing is not possible. The reason is that when removing strategies in an iterated
fashion, in particular in the one-at-a-time fashion, some previously undomi-
nated strategies can become eligible for removal. So this process can yield a
different outcome than a single removal of several strategies.
In contrast, the following definition seems to capture a relevant property.
We say that that a reduction relation ⇒R satisfies the one-at-a-time prop-
erty if
⇒+
1,R = ⇒
+
R.
Obviously, if ⇒+
1,R = ⇒
+
R, then also ⇒
∗
1,R = ⇒
∗
R. The following result
clarifies when the one-at-a-time property holds.
Theorem 3.2 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a dominance relation R
that is hereditary the ⇒R relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property.
Proof. Note that always ⇒1,R ⊆ ⇒R, so ⇒
+
1,R ⊆ ⇒
+
R always holds.
To prove the inverse inclusion it suffices to show that ⇒R ⊆ ⇒
+
1,R. So
suppose that G⇒RG
′. We prove that G⇒+
1,RG
′ by induction on the number
k of strategies deleted in the transition from G to G′. If k = 1, then G⇒1,RG
′
holds.
Suppose now that claim holds for some k > 1. Assume thatG := (S1, . . ., Sn,
p1, . . ., pn) and G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn). For each i ∈ [1..n] let Si \ S
′
i :=
{t1i , . . ., t
ki
i }. So for all i ∈ [1..n] and all j ∈ [1..ki] the strategy t
j
i is R-
dominated in G by some sji ∈ S
′
i. Choose some strategy t
j0
i0
and let G′′ be the
game resulting from G by removing tj0i0 from Si0 . Then G⇒1,RG
′′.
Since tj0i0 6∈ ∪
n
i=1S
′
i each strategy s
j
i is in G
′′. So by the hereditarity of R each
strategy tji , where (i, j) 6= (i0, j0), is R-dominated in G
′′ by sji . This means
that G′′⇒RG
′. By the induction hypothesis G′′⇒+
1,RG
′, hence G⇒+
1,RG
′. ✷
Now, given a dominance relation R that is hereditary and is a strict par-
tial order we can establish that the ⇒R reduction relation on the set of all
restrictions of a game H satisfies the unique normal form property (in short:
is UN ) in one of the following three ways:
• by showing that ⇒R is one step closed; this is the argument provided
by Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990],
• by proving that ⇒R is weakly confluent,
• by proving that ⇒1,R is weakly confluent.
In the last case one actually proceeds by showing that ⇒1,R satisfies the
diamond property, where we say that → satisfies the diamond property if
for all a, b, c ∈ A such that b 6= c
a
ւ ց
b c
implies that for some d ∈ A
b c
ց ւ
d
All three proofs are straightforward. As an illustration we provide the proof
for the second approach as its pattern will be repeated a number of times.
Lemma 3.3 (Weak Confluence) Consider a dominance relation R that is
hereditary and is a strict partial order. Then the ⇒R relation on the set of all
restrictions of a game H is weakly confluent.
Proof. Suppose
G
⇑
R R ⇓
G′ G′′
We prove that then
G′ G′′
⇑
R ⇓
ǫ ǫ
R
G′ ∩G′′
Recall that a⇒ǫR b means a⇒R b or a = b.
If G′ is a restriction of G′ ∩ G′′, then G′ = G′ ∩ G′′ and consequently
G′⇒ǫRG
′ ∩G′′. Otherwise suppose
G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn),
G′′ := (S ′′1 , . . ., S
′′
n, p1, . . ., pn).
Then
G′ ∩G′′ = (S ′1 ∩ S
′′
1 , . . ., S
′
n ∩ S
′′
n, p1, . . ., pn).
Fix i ∈ [1..n] and consider a strategy si ∈ S
′
i such that si 6∈ S
′
i ∩ S
′′
i . So si is
eliminated in the step G⇒RG
′′. Hence some s′i ∈ Si R-dominates si in G.
Case 1. s′i ∈ S
′
i.
G′ is a restriction of G and R is hereditary so s′i also R-dominates si in G
′.
Case 2. s′i 6∈ S
′
i.
So s′i is eliminated in the step G⇒RG
′. Hence a strategy s′′i ∈ S
′
i exists
that R-dominates s′i in G. By the transitivity of R, s
′′
i R-dominates si in G
and hence, by hereditarity, in G′.
This proves G′→RG
′ ∩ G′′ and hence, by the Equivalence Lemma 3.1,
G′⇒RG
′ ∩G′′.
By symmetry G′′⇒ǫRG
′ ∩G′′. ✷
This brings us to the following result of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990].
Theorem 3.4 (Elimination) For a dominance relation R that is hereditary
and a strict partial order the ⇒R relation is UN. ✷
To illustrate a direct use of the above results consider the strict dominance
relation S. It entails the reduction relation ⇒S on games obtained by in-
stantiating R in ⇒R by the strict dominance relation. As already noted by
Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] strict dominance is clearly hereditary and is a
strict partial order. So we get the following conclusion.
Theorem 3.5 (Strict Elimination)
(i) The ⇒S relation is UN.
(ii) The ⇒S relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. ✷
In other words, the process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies yields a unique outcome and coincides with the outcome of the
iterated elimination of a single dominated strategy.
4 Pure Strategies: Inherent Dominance
In this section we introduce and study a natural generalization of the binary
dominance notion, due to Bo¨rgers [1990,1993]. Consider a game (S1, . . ., Sn,
p1, . . ., pn). Let R be a dominance relation and S˜−i a non-empty subset of
S−i. We say that a strategy si is R-dominated given S˜−i by a strategy s
′
i
if si is R-dominated by s
′
i in the game (Si, S˜−i, p1, . . ., pn). Then we say that
a strategy si is inherently R-dominated if for every non-empty subset S˜−i
of S−i it is R-dominated given S˜−i by some strategy s
′
i. So we turned in this
way the binary relation R to a unary relation on the strategies.
Note that in the definition of inherent R-dominance for each subset S˜−i of
S−i a different strategy of player i can R-dominate the considered strategy si.
This can make this notion of dominance stronger than R-dominance. Bo¨rgers
[1990,1993] studied this notion of dominance for R being weak dominance and
established for it the order independence. The resulting dominance relation,
inherent weak dominance, is an intermediate notion between strict and weak
dominance. Indeed, it is clearly implied by strict dominance and implies in
turn weak dominance. The converse implications do not hold as the following
two examples show. In the game
L R
T 2,− 1,−
M 1,− 2,−
B 1,− 3,−
the strategy M is weakly dominated by T given {L} and weakly dominated
by B given {R} or given {L,R}. So M is inherently weakly dominated but is
not strictly dominated by any strategy.
In turn in the game
L R
T 2,− 1,−
B 1,− 1,−
the strategy B is not inherently weakly dominated but is weakly dominated.
It is well-known that weak dominance is not order independent. We shall
return to this matter in Section 11. The intuitive reason is that weak domi-
nance is not hereditary. As a consequence the proof of the corresponding weak
confluence property does not go through.
The notion of inherent R-dominance does not fit into the framework devel-
oped in Section 3, since it is a unary relation. However, when studying reduc-
tion by means of it we can proceed in a largely analogous fashion. So first we
introduce two notions of reduction between a game G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn)
and its restriction G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn), this time involving the inherent
R-dominance notion.
• We write G→inh−RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is inherently R-dominated in G.
• We write G⇒inh−RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n] for every
non-empty subset S˜−i of S−i
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G given S˜−i by some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i.
So in the →inh−R relation for every non-empty subset S˜−i of S−i we require
R-dominance in G given S˜−i by some s
′
i ∈ Si, while in the ⇒inh−R relation for
every non-empty subset S˜−i of S−i we require R-dominance in G given S˜−i by
some s′i ∈ S
′
i. Bo¨rgers [1990,1993] considered the first relation, →inh−R , for R
being weak dominance. We introduce the second one, ⇒inh−R , to streamline
the presentation. As in Section 3 under a natural assumption both notions
turn out to be equivalent.
Lemma 4.1 (Equivalence) For a dominance relation R that is a strict par-
tial order the relations →inh−R and ⇒inh−R coincide.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the Equivalence Lemma 3.1. It suffices
to show that if G→inh−RG
′, then G⇒inh−RG
′.
Let G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn). Suppose
that some si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is inherently R-dominated in G. Let S˜−i be a non-
empty subset of S−i. Some strategy s
′
i ∈ Si R-dominates si in G given S˜−i.
R is a strict partial order and Si is finite, so a strategy s
′
i ∈ Si exists that
R-dominates si in G given S˜−i and is not R-dominated in G given S˜−i by
any strategy in Si. So this s
′
i is not eliminated in the step G→inh−RG
′ and
consequently si is R-dominated in G given S˜−i by some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i. ✷
The following simple observation relates the ⇒inh−R reduction relation to
the previously introduced relation ⇒R.
Note 4.2 (Comparison) Consider a dominance relation R. Then
(i) ⇒inh−R ⊆ ⇒R.
(ii) If R is hereditary, then the relations ⇒inh−R and ⇒R coincide. ✷
So for hereditary dominance relations no new reduction relations were in-
troduced here. Further, it is easy to provide examples of a non-hereditary R,
for instance weak dominance, for which the reduction relations ⇒inh−R and
⇒R differ.
We now establish order independence for specific ⇒inh−R reduction rela-
tions. Following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] we say that a dominance rela-
tion R satisfies the individual independence of irrelevant alternatives
condition (in short, IIIA) if for every game (Si, S−i, p1, . . ., pn) the following
holds:
for all i ∈ [1..n], all non-empty S ′i ⊆ Si and si, s
′
i ∈ S
′
i
si R s
′
i holds in (Si, S−i, p1, . . ., pn) iff it holds in (S
′
i, S−i, p1, . . ., pn).
IIIA is a very reasonable condition. All specific dominance relations con-
sidered in this paper satisfy it.
Lemma 4.3 (Weak Confluence) For a dominance relation R that satisfies
the IIIA condition and is a strict partial order the ⇒inh−R relation on the set
of all restrictions of a game H is weakly confluent.
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of the Weak Confluence Lemma 3.3. Sup-
pose G⇒inh−RG
′ and G⇒inh−RG
′′. We prove that then G′⇒ ǫinh−RG
′ ∩ G′′
and G′′⇒ ǫinh−RG
′ ∩G′′.
If G′ is a restriction of G′ ∩ G′′, then G′ = G′ ∩ G′′ and consequently
G′⇒ ǫinh−RG
′ ∩ G′′. Otherwise suppose G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn), G
′′ :=
(S ′′1 , . . ., S
′′
n, p1, . . ., pn). Then G
′ ∩G′′ = (S ′1 ∩ S
′′
1 , . . ., S
′
n ∩ S
′′
n, p1, . . ., pn).
Fix i ∈ [1..n]. Consider a strategy si ∈ S
′
i such that si 6∈ S
′
i ∩ S
′′
i . So si is
eliminated in the step G⇒ inh−RG
′′. Take now a non-empty subset S˜−i of S
′
−i
(and hence of S−i). The strategy si is R-dominated given S˜−i in G by some
strategy s′i ∈ Si.
Case 1. s′i ∈ S
′
i.
Then, since R satisfies the IIIA condition, si R s
′
i holds in the game
(S ′i, S˜−i, p1, . . ., pn), i.e., si is R-dominated given S˜−i in G
′.
Case 2. s′i 6∈ S
′
i.
So s′i is eliminated in the step G⇒ inh−RG
′. Hence a strategy s′′i ∈ S
′
i exists
that R-dominates s′i in G given S˜−i. By the transitivity of R the strategy s
′′
i
R-dominates si in G given S˜−i and hence, since R satisfies the IIIA condition,
si is R-dominated given S˜−i in G
′.
So we showed that each strategy si of player i eliminated in the transition
fromG′ to G′∩G′′ is inherently R-dominated in G′. This proves G′→inh−RG
′∩
G′′ and hence, by the Equivalence Lemma 4.1 G′⇒inh−RG
′ ∩G′′.
By symmetry G′′⇒ ǫinh−RG
′ ∩G′′. ✷
We can now draw the desired conclusion using Newman’s Lemma 2.1.
Theorem 4.4 (Inherent Elimination) For a dominance relation R that sat-
isfies the IIIA condition and is a strict partial order the ⇒ inh−R relation is
UN. ✷
As in Section 3 we introduce the ⇒1,inh−R reduction relation that removes
exactly one strategy, and as before we say that ⇒inh−R satisfies the one-at-
a-time property when
⇒+
1,inh−R = ⇒
+
inh−R.
The following counterpart of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2
then holds.
Theorem 4.5 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a dominance relation R
that satisfies the IIIA condition the relation ⇒inh−R satisfies the one-at-a-
time property.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2
and omitted. ✷
Since the weak dominance relation W satisfies the IIIA condition and is a
strict partial order, by the above results we get the following counterpart of
the Strict Elimination Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 4.6 (Inherent Weak Elimination)
(i) The ⇒inh−W relation is UN.
(ii) The ⇒inh−W relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. ✷
The first item was established in Bo¨rgers [1990]. In Bo¨rgers [1993] it was
shown that a strategy is inherently weakly dominated iff it is not rational, in
the sense that it is not a best response to a belief formed over the pure strate-
gies of other players when their payoff functions are not known — it is only
assumed that their payoff functions are compatible with their publicly known
preferences. So the ⇒inh−W relation allows us to model iterated removal of
strategies that are not rational in this sense.
5 Mixed Dominance Relations
The notion of dominance studied in Section 3 involved two pure strategies.
In this section we study the dominance relations in which the dominating
strategies are mixed and develop the appropriate general results.
Let us recall first the definitions. Given a set of strategies Si available to
player i, by amixed strategy we mean a probability distribution over Si and
denote this set of mixed strategies by Mi.
Given a mixed strategy mi we define
support(mi) := {si ∈ Si | mi(si) > 0}.
Consider a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn). Each payoff function pi is gener-
alized to a function
pi : M1 × . . .×Mn→R
by putting for a sequence (m1, . . ., mn) of mixed strategies from M1× . . .×Mn
pi(m1, . . ., mn) :=
∑
s∈S
m1(s1) . . . mn(sn) pi(s).
As usual, we identify a mixed strategy for player i of a restriction G′ of G
with a mixed strategy of G by assigning the probability 0 to the strategies of
player i that are present in G but not in G′. Further, we can view a mixed
strategy for player i in G as a mixed strategy in G′ if its support is a subset
of the set of all strategies of player i in G′. Also, we can identify each pure
strategy si with the mixed strategy that assigns to si the probability 1.
A mixed dominance relation is a function that assigns to each game
G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) a subset RG of
⋃n
i=1(Si × Mi). When si RG m
′
i
holds we say that si R m
′
i holds for G and also say that si is R-dominated
by m′i in G, or that m
′
i R-dominates si in G.
As in Section 3 we introduce now two notions of reduction between a game
G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and its restriction G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn),
this time involving a mixed dominance relation R.
• We write G→RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G by some m
′
i ∈Mi.
• We write G⇒RG
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is R-dominated in G by some m
′
i ∈M
′
i .
So, as before, the difference between the →R and ⇒R lies in the require-
ment we put on the R-dominating —this time mixed— strategy. In →R we
require that each strategy removed from Si is R-dominated in G by a mixed
strategy in Mi, while in ⇒R we require that it is R-dominated in G by a
mixed strategy in M ′i . So in the latter case no strategy from the support of
the R-dominating mixed strategy should be removed at the same time.
To establish equivalence between both reduction relations we need a coun-
terpart of the notion of a strict partial order. Below, we occasionally write
each mixed strategym′ over the set of strategies Si as the sum
∑
t∈Si
ptt, where
each pt = m
′(t). Then given two mixed strategies m1, m2 and a strategy t1 we
mean by m2[t1/m1] the mixed strategy obtained from m2 by substituting the
strategy t1 by m1 and by ‘normalizing’ the resulting sum.
We now say that a mixed dominance relation R is regular if in every game
• for all α ∈ (0, 1], s R (1− α)s+ α m implies s R m,
• t1 R m1 and t2 R m2 implies t1 R m1[t2/m2].
Lemma 5.1 (Equivalence) For a mixed dominance relation R that is regu-
lar the relations →R and ⇒R coincide.
Proof. We only need to show that G→RG
′ implies G⇒RG
′.
Let G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn). Take
some s′′i ∈ Si \ S
′
i. Let Si \ S
′
i := {t1, . . ., tk} with tk = s
′′
i . By definition for
all j ∈ [1..n] some mj ∈ Mi exists such that tj R mj (holds in G). We prove
by complete induction that in fact for all j ∈ [1..k] some m′j ∈Mi exists such
that tj R m
′
j and support(m
′
j) ∩ {t1, . . ., tj} = ∅.
For some α ∈ (0, 1] and a mixed strategy m′1 with t1 6∈ support(m
′
1) we
have
m1 = (1− α)t1 + α m
′
1.
Since R is regular, t1 R m1 implies t1 R m
′
1, which proves the claim for k = 1.
Assume now the claim holds for all ℓ ∈ [1..j]. We have tj+1 R mj+1. As in
the case of k = 1 a mixed strategy m′′j+1 exists such that tj+1 6∈ support(m
′′
j+1)
and tj+1 R m
′′
j+1. Let
m′j+1 := m
′′
j+1[t1/m
′
1]. . .[tj/m
′
j ].
Then for all ℓ ∈ [1..j] we have support(m′′j+1[t1/m
′
1]. . .[tℓ/m
′
ℓ])∩{t1, . . ., tℓ, tj+1} =
∅, so support(m′j+1) ∩ {t1, . . ., tj+1} = ∅, i.e., support(m
′
j+1)⊆ S
′
i.
Also tj+1 R m
′′
j+1 and tℓ R m
′
ℓ for all ℓ ∈ [1..j] imply by the regularity of
R that tj+1 R m
′
j+1. Hence s
′′
i (which equals tk) is R-dominated by the mixed
strategy m′k ∈M
′
i . ✷
The second condition of the regularity notion appears in Lemma 1 of Rob-
les [2003] under the name ‘transitivity’. In that paper order independence
of conditional dominance is established, a notion introduced in Shimoji and
Watson [1998]. Establishing ‘transitivity’ for a specialized form of conditional
dominance (called a robust demi-replacement) turns out to be a crucial step in
the proof of the order independence. In our case regularity allows us to focus
our representation on the second reduction relation, ⇒R.
In analogy to the case of dominance relations we say that a mixed dom-
inance relation R is hereditary if for every game G, its restriction G′, a
strategy si of G
′ and a mixed strategy m′i of G
′
si is R-dominated by m
′
i in G implies si is R-dominated by m
′
i in G
′.
Also, as in the case of the dominance relations, given a mixed dominance
relation R we can specialize the reduction relation ⇒R to ⇒1,R in which a
single strategy is removed. The following counterpart of the One-at-a-time
Elimination Theorem 3.2 then holds.
Theorem 5.2 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a mixed dominance rela-
tion R that is hereditary the ⇒R satisfies the one-at-a-time property.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2
and left to the reader. ✷
As in Section 3 for a mixed dominance relation R that is hereditary and
regular we have three ways of proving that the reduction relation ⇒R is UN.
Here, for a change, we provide a proof for the first approach.
Lemma 5.3 (One Step Closedness) For a mixed dominance relation R that
is hereditary and regular the ⇒R relation is one step closed.
Proof. Given a game G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), let G
′′ := (S ′′1 , . . ., S
′′
n,
p1, . . ., pn) be the game obtained from G by removing all the strategies that are
R-dominated by a mixed strategy in G. Then G→ ǫRG
′′, so by the Equivalence
Lemma 5.1 G⇒ ǫRG
′′.
Suppose now that G⇒RG
′ for some G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn). Then
clearly S ′′i ⊆ S
′
i for all i ∈ [1..n]. If G
′ and G′′ coincide, then G′⇒ ǫRG
′′.
Otherwise fix i ∈ [1..n] and consider a strategy si such that si ∈ S
′
i \ S
′′
i .
So si is eliminated in the step G⇒RG
′′. Hence si is R-dominated in G by a
mixed strategy m′i ∈ M
′′
i . By the hereditarity of R si is R-dominated in G
′
by m′i. This proves G
′⇒RG
′′. ✷
The reader may note a ‘detour’ in this proof through the → reduction,
justified by the Equivalence Lemma 5.1. The above lemma brings us to the
following conclusion.
Theorem 5.4 (Mixed Elimination) For a mixed dominance relation R that
is hereditary and regular the ⇒R relation is UN.
Proof. We noted already in Section 2 that one step closedness implies weak
confluence. So Newman’s Lemma 2.1 applies. ✷
In other words, when R is a mixed dominance relation that is heredi-
tary and regular, the process of iterated elimination of R-dominated strategies
yields a unique outcome.
We can directly apply the results of this section to strict dominance by
mixed strategies. Let us recall first the definition. Consider a game (S1, . . ., Sn,
p1, . . ., pn). We say that a strategy si is strictly dominated by a mixed
strategy m′i, or equivalently, that a mixed strategy m
′
i strictly dominates a
strategy si, if
pi(si, s−i) < pi(m
′
i, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i.
This mixed dominance relation entails the reduction relation ⇒SM on
games obtained by instantiating the mixed dominance relation R in ⇒R by
the strict dominance in the above sense. Clearly, strict dominance by a mixed
strategy is hereditary and regular, so by virtue of the above results we get the
following counterpart of the Strict Elimination Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 5.5 (Strict Mixed Elimination)
(i) The ⇒SM relation is UN.
(ii) The ⇒SM relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. ✷
The first item states that strict dominance by means of mixed strategies is
order independent.
6 Mixed Strategies: Inherent Dominance
The concepts and results of Section 4 can be naturally modified to the case of
mixed dominance relations. Consider such a relation R and a game (S1, . . ., Sn,
p1, . . ., pn) and let S˜−i be a non-empty subset of S−i. We say that a strategy
si is R-dominated given S˜−i by a mixed strategy m
′
i if si is R-dominated by
m′i in the game (Si, S˜−i, p1, . . ., pn) and say that a strategy si is inherently
R-dominated if for every non-empty subset S˜−i of S−i it is R-dominated
given S˜−i by some mixed strategy m
′
i.
As before, each mixed dominance relation R entails two reduction relations
→inh−R and ⇒inh−R on games and their ‘one-at-a-time’ versions, →1,inh−R
and ⇒1,R.
The individual independence of irrelevant alternatives condition
(IIIA) now holds for a mixed dominance relation R if for every game (Si, S−i,
p1, . . ., pn)
for all i ∈ [1..n], all non-empty S ′i ⊆ Si, si ∈ S
′
i and mi ∈M
′
i
si R m
′
i holds in (Si, S−i, p1, . . ., pn) iff it holds in (S
′
i, S−i, p1, . . ., pn).
By analogy we obtain the following results concerning the introduced re-
duction relations.
Lemma 6.1 (Equivalence) For a mixed dominance relation R that is regu-
lar the relations →inh−R and ⇒inh−R coincide.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the Equivalence Lemma 5.1 and omitted. ✷
Lemma 6.2 (One Step Closedness) For a mixed dominance relation R that
satisfies the IIIA condition and is regular the ⇒inh−R relation is one step
closed.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One Step Closedness Lemma 5.3, using
the Equivalence Lemma 6.1, and omitted. ✷
Theorem 6.3 (Inherent Mixed Elimination) For a mixed dominance re-
lation R that satisfies the IIIA condition and is regular the ⇒ inh−R relation
is UN. ✷
Proof. By the One Step Closedness Lemma 6.2 and Newman’s Lemma 2.1.
✷
Theorem 6.4 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a mixed dominance rela-
tion R that satisfies the IIIA condition the ⇒inh−R relation satisfies the one-
at-a-time property.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2
and omitted. ✷
These results can be directly applied to weak dominance by a mixed strat-
egy. Recall that given a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) we say that a strategy si
is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy m′i, and write si WM m
′
i, if
pi(si, s−i) ≤ pi(m
′
i, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i, with some disequality being strict.
It is straightforward to check that WM satisfies the IIIA condition and is
regular. However, somewhat unexpectedly, we do not get now any new results,
since as shown by Bo¨rgers [1990] the reduction relations →inh−WM and →SM
(and hence ⇒inh−WM and ⇒SM) coincide.
7 More on Abstract Reduction Systems
We shall soon deal with the elimination of payoff equivalent strategies and to
this end we shall need a refinement of Newman’s Lemma 2.1. Consider an
abstract reduction system (A, → ) and assume an equivalence relation ∼ on
A. We now relativize the previously introduced notions to ∼ and introduce
one new concept linking → and ∼.
• If every element of A has a unique up to ∼ normal form, we say that
(A, → ) (or simply → ) satisfies the ∼-unique normal form prop-
erty .
• We say that → is ∼-weakly confluent if for all a, b, c ∈ A
a
ւ ց
b c
implies that for some d1, d2 ∈ A
b c
ց∗ ∗ ւ
d1 ∼ d2
• We say that → is ∼-bisimilar if for all a, b, c ∈ A
a ∼ b
↓
c
implies that for some d ∈ A
a ∼ b
↓ ↓
c ∼ d
The following lemma is then a relativized version of Newman’s Lemma
2.1. It is a special case of Lemma 2.7 from Huet [1980, page 803], with a more
direct proof.
Lemma 7.1 (∼-Newman) Consider an abstract reduction system (A, → )
and an equivalence relation ∼ on A such that
• no infinite → sequences exist,
• → is ∼-weakly confluent,
• → is ∼-bisimilar.
Then → satisfies the ∼-unique normal form property.
Proof.We modify the proof of Newman’s Lemma 2.1. We call now an element
a ambiguous if it has at least two normal forms that are not equivalent w.r.t. ∼.
As before we show that for every ambiguous a some ambiguous b exists such
that a→ b. This proves absence of ambiguous elements by the first assumption.
So suppose that some element a has two distinct normal forms n1 and n2
such that n1 6∼ n2. Then for some b, c we have a→ b→
∗ n1 and a→ c→
∗ n2.
By the ∼-weak confluence some d1 and d2 exist such that b→
∗ d1, c→
∗ d2 and
d1 ∼ d2. Let n3 be a normal form of d1. Then it is a normal form of b, as well.
By the repeated use of the ∼-bisimilarity of →
d1 ∼ d2
↓∗
n3
implies that for some n4 ∈ A
d1 ∼ d2
↓∗ ↓∗
n3 ∼ n4
Since n3 is a normal form, by the ∼-bisimilarity of → so is n4. So n4 is
a normal form of c. Moreover n3 6∼ n1 or n3 6∼ n2, since otherwise n1 ∼ n2
would hold. If n3 6∼ n1, then b is ambiguous and a→ b. And if n3 6∼ n2, then
also n4 6∼ n2 and then c is ambiguous and a→ c. ✷
Also, we have the following relativized version of the Unique Normal Form
Note 2.2.
Note 7.2 (∼-Unique Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction sys-
tems (A, →1 ) and (A, →2 ) and an equivalence relation ∼ on A such that
• →1 satisfies the ∼-unique normal form property,
• →+1 = →
+
2 .
Then →2 satisfies the ∼-unique normal form property. ✷
We shall also study the combined effect of two forms of elimination. In
what follows we abbreviate →1 ∪ →2 to →1∨2 . (The use of ∪ instead of
∨ would clash with the notation used in Section 10.) Given two abstract
reduction systems (A, →1 ) and (A, →2 ) we say that →1 left commutes
with →2 if
→1 ◦ →2 ⊆ →2 ◦ →
∗
1 ,
i.e., if for all a, b, c ∈ A a→1 b→2 c implies that for some d ∈ A a→2 d→
∗
1 c.
Note 7.3 (Left Commutativity) If →1 left commutes with →2, then so
does →+1 . ✷
Then we shall rely on the following result.
Lemma 7.4 (Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction systems
(A, →1 ) and (A, →2 ) and an equivalence relation ∼ on A such that
• (A, →1∨2) satisfies the ∼-unique normal form property,
• →1 left commutes with →2.
Then for all a ∈ A, if
a
∗ւ2 2ց∗
b c
for some →2 -normal forms b and c, then for some →1∨2 -normal forms d1, d2 ∈
A
b c
1ց∗ ∗ւ1
d1 ∼ d2.
Proof. Suppose that a→∗2b and a→
∗
2c where b and c are →2 -normal forms.
By the first assumption for some →1∨2 -normal forms d1, d2 ∈ A we have
b→∗1∨2d1, c→
∗
1∨2d2 and d1 ∼ d2.
If for some e1, e2 ∈ A we have b→
+
1 e1 →2e2 →
∗
1∨2d1, then by the second
assumption and the Left Commutativity Note 7.3 for some e3 ∈ A we have
b→2e3 →
∗
1e2, which contradicts the choice of b. So in the path b→
∗
1∨2d1 there
are no →2 transitions. By the same argument also in the path c→
∗
1∨2d2 there
are no →2 transitions. ✷
8 Pure Strategies: Payoff Equivalence
We now move on to a study of the elimination of payoff equivalent strategies.
This binary relation on the strategies, PE, entails the corresponding reduction
relation ⇒PE on the games. Let us recall the definition. Given a game
G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and its restriction G
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn)
• G⇒PE G
′ iff G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each si ∈ Si \ S
′
i is payoff equivalent in G to some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i.
Note that ⇒PE is not weakly confluent and it does not satisfy the unique
normal form property. Indeed, given two payoff equivalent strategies r and
s, the removal of r and the removal of s yields two different games. But
these games are obviously equivalent in the sense that a renaming of their
strategies makes them identical. To study the effect of the removal of the
payoff equivalent strategies we shall therefore consider the following equiv-
alence relation ∼ between two games, G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and
G′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p
′
1, . . ., p
′
n):
G′ ∼ G′′ iff for all i ∈ [1..n] there exists a 1-1 and onto mapping fi : Si→ S
′
i
such that for all i ∈ [1..n] and si ∈ Si, pi(s1, . . ., sn) = p
′
i(f1(s1), . . ., fn(sn)).
In what follows we shall consider various (also mixed) reduction relations
⇒R on games in presence of the ∼ equivalence relation on the games. In each
case it will be straightforward to see that ⇒R is ∼-bisimilar. Intuitively, the
∼-bisimilarity of ⇒R simply means that R does not depend on the strategy
names.
Note that if a (mixed) reduction relation R is hereditary, then to prove
that ⇒R is ∼-bisimilar it is sufficient on the account of the One-at-a-time
Elimination Theorems 3.2 and 5.2 to check that ⇒1,R is ∼-bisimilar.
Instead of saying that a reduction relation ⇒R on the set of all restrictions
of a game H satisfies the ∼-unique normal form property, we shall simply say
that ⇒R is ∼-UN .
To reason about the ⇒PE reduction relation we shall focus on the rela-
tion ⇒1,PE concerned with the removal of a single strategy payoff equivalent
strategy. The following simple observation holds.
Lemma 8.1 (Weak Confluence) Consider a game H. The ⇒1,PE relation
on the set of all restrictions of a game H is ∼-weakly confluent.
Proof. Suppose G⇒1,PE G
′ and G⇒1,PE G
′′. Let r and s be the strategies
eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. If r and s are pay-
off equivalent in G, then G′ ∼ G′′. Otherwise, by the hereditarity of PE,
G′⇒1,PE G
′ ∩G′′ and G′′⇒1,PE G
′ ∩G′′. ✷
This brings us to the following result that we shall need in the sequel.
Theorem 8.2 (Payoff Equivalence Elimination)
(i) The ⇒1,PE relation is ∼-UN.
(ii) The ⇒PE relation is ∼-UN.
Proof.
(i) We just proved that ⇒1,PE is ∼-weakly confluent. Also, this reduction
relation is clearly ∼-bisimilar. So the conclusion follows by the ∼-Newman’s
Lemma 7.1.
(ii) First note that PE is hereditary, so by the One-at-a-time Elimination
Theorem 3.2 ⇒PE satisfies the one-at-a-time property, that is,
⇒+
1,PE = ⇒
+
PE.
It suffices now to apply the ∼-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2. ✷
Informally, the process of iterated elimination of payoff equivalent strate-
gies yields a unique outcome up to the introduced equivalence relation ∼ on
the games. This outcome can also be achieved in one step, by replacing each
maximal set of at least two mutually payoff equivalent strategies by one rep-
resentative. The resulting game is called in Myerson [1991] a purely reduced
game. Of course, the above result is completely expected. Still, we find that
a concise formal justification of it is in order.
9 Mixed Strategies: Randomized Redundance
The notion of payoff equivalent strategies generalizes in the obvious way to
the mixed strategies. We denote by PEM the corresponding mixed dominance
relation. So for a strategy si and a mixed strategy m
′
i of player i si PEM m
′
i
if
pj(si, s−i) = pj(m
′
i, s−i)
for all j ∈ [1..n] and all s−i ∈ S−i.
As explained in Section 5 PEM entails the reduction relation ⇒PEM on
games. Recall that a strategy si of player i is called randomized redundant
to a mixed strategy mi if it is payoff equivalent to mi and si 6∈ support(mi).
Note that for a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and its restrictionG
′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n,
p1, . . ., pn) we have
• G⇒PEM G
′ when G 6= G′ and for all i ∈ [1..n]
each s′i ∈ Si \ S
′
i is randomized redundant in G to some m
′
i ∈M
′
i .
As in the case of payoff equivalence it is more convenient to focus on the re-
moval of a single strategy, so on the reduction relation ⇒1,PEM . The following
counterpart of the Weak Confluence Lemma 8.1 holds.
Lemma 9.1 (Weak Confluence) Consider a game H. The ⇒1,PEM rela-
tion on the set of all restrictions of a game H is ∼-weakly confluent.
Proof. Suppose G⇒1,PEM G
′ and G⇒1,PEM G
′′. Let r and t be the strategies
eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. If r and t are payoff
equivalent, then, as in the proof of the Weak Confluence Lemma 8.1, G′ ∼ G′′.
Otherwise for some α ∈ [0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1) r is payoff equivalent to a mixed
strategy α t + (1 − α)m1 with r, t 6∈ support(m1) and t is payoff equivalent
to a mixed strategy β r + (1 − β)m2 with r, t 6∈ support(m2). So r is payoff
equivalent to α β r + α(1− β)m2 + (1− α)m1, and hence to
m′ := (α(1− β)m2 + (1− α)m1)/(1− α β).
Since t 6∈ support(m′), m′ is a mixed strategy in G′′. So by the hereditarity
of PEM r is payoff equivalent to m′ in G′′. Further, since r, t 6∈ support(m′),
m′ is a mixed strategy in G′ ∩G′′. So we showed that G′′⇒1,PEM G
′ ∩G′′. By
symmetry G′⇒1,PEM G
′ ∩G′′. ✷
As in the case of the ⇒PE relation we can now conclude.
Theorem 9.2 (Redundance Elimination)
(i) The ⇒1,PEM relation is ∼-UN.
(ii) The ⇒PEM relation is ∼-UN. ✷
So the process of iterated elimination of randomized redundant strategies
yields a unique up to ∼ outcome. The result is called in Myerson [1991] a
fully reduced game.
10 Combining Two Dominance Relations
Given two dominance relation R,Q we now consider the combined dominance
relation R ∪ Q. Such a combination is meaningful to study when Q is such
that the ⇒Q reduction relation is ∼-UN. An example is the payoff equivalence
PE relation discussed in Section 8.
Given two dominance relations R and Q we would like now to identify
conditions that allow us to conclude that the ⇒R∪Q reduction relation is ∼-
UN. To this end we introduce the following concept. We say that R is closed
under Q if in all games G for all strategies r, s, t
• r R s and s Q t implies r R t,
• r Q s and s R t implies r R t,
i.e., if in all games R ◦Q⊆R and Q ◦R⊆ R.
Here is a result that we shall use in the sequel.
Theorem 10.1 (Combination) Consider two dominance relations R and Q
such that
• ⇒R and ⇒Q are ∼-bisimilar,
• R is a strict partial order,
• R is closed under Q,
• ⇒ 1,Q is ∼-UN,
• R ∪Q is hereditary.
Then the ⇒R∪Q relation is ∼-UN.
Notice that we do not insist here that R is hereditary. In fact, in one of
the uses of the above result the dominance relation R will not be hereditary.
Proof. Since R∪Q is hereditary, by the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem
3.2 and the ∼-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2 it suffices to prove that ⇒ 1,R∪Q is
∼-UN. But by assumption both ⇒ 1,R and ⇒ 1,Q are ∼-bisimilar, so ⇒ 1,R∪Q
is ∼-bisimilar, as well. So on the account of the ∼-Newman’s Lemma 7.1
the fact that ⇒ 1,R∪Q is ∼-UN is established once we show that ⇒ 1,R∪Q is
∼-weakly confluent.
So suppose that G⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ and G⇒ 1,R∪QG
′′. Let r and s be the strate-
gies eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. By the fourth
assumption ⇒ 1,Q is is ∼-weakly confluent, so we only need to consider a
situation when G⇒1,RG
′.
We can assume that G′ 6= G′′. Then r is in G′′ and s is in G′. By definition
r R t holds in G for some strategy t of G′ and s R ∪Q u holds in G for some
strategy u of G′′. To show that G′′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩G′′ we consider two cases.
Case 1. t is in G′′, i.e., s 6= t.
Then, by the hereditarity of R ∪Q, r R ∪Q t holds in G′′.
Case 2. t is not in G′′, i.e., s = t.
Then r R s holds in G. If s R u holds in G, then, by the transitivity of R
also r R u holds in G.
If sQ u holds in G, then by the fact that R is closed under Q r R u holds
in G, as well. Further, r 6= u by the irreflexivity of R, so u is in G′. Hence, by
Case 1, r R ∪Q u holds in G′′.
This proves that G′′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩ G′′. To show that G′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩ G′′ we
again consider two cases.
Case 1. u is in G′, i.e., u 6= r.
Then, by the hereditarity of R∪Q, s R∪Q u holds in G′. Also u is in G′′.
Case 2. u is not in G′, i.e., u = r.
Then s R ∪ Q r holds in G. If s R r holds in G, then, by the transitivity
of R, s R t holds in G.
If sQ r holds in G, then by the fact that R is closed under Q sR t holds in
G, as well. But s and t are strategies of G′, so by the hereditarity of R s R t
holds in G′. This shows G′→RG
′ ∩G′′.
By the Equivalence Lemma 3.1 the relations →R and ⇒R coincide, so
some strategy t′ of G′ ∩ G′′ exists such that s R t′, and a fortiori s R ∪ Q t′,
holds in G′.
This proves that G′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩G′′. ✷
This result is a generalization of the Elimination Theorem 3.4. Indeed, it
suffices to use instead of ∼ the identity relation on games, and use as Q the
identity dominance relation (according to which a strategy is only dominated
by itself). Then the assumptions of the above theorem reduce to those of the
Elimination Theorem 3.4.
As a simple application of this result consider the combination of the strict
dominance and the payoff equivalence. The strict dominance relation is hered-
itary and so is PE, and a union of two hereditary dominance relations is hered-
itary. Further, strict dominance is a strict partial order and is easily seen to
be closed under the payoff equivalence. So the following direct consequence
of the Payoff Equivalence Elimination Theorem 8.2(i) and of the above result
holds.
Theorem 10.2 (Combined Strict Elimination) The ⇒S∪PE relation is
∼-UN. ✷
In other words, the combined iterated elimination of strategies in which
at each step we remove some strictly dominated strategies and some payoff
equivalent strategies yields a unique up to the equivalence relation ∼ outcome.
11 Combining NiceWeak Dominance with
Payoff Equivalence
In this section we show another application of the Combination Theorem 10.1
concerned with a modification of the weak dominance. We denote by ⇒W the
reduction relation on games corresponding to weak dominance. As mentioned
earlier, ⇒W does not satisfy the unique normal form property. An example
relevant for us will be provided in a moment.
We studied already one modification of weak dominance in Section 4 by
considering inherent weak dominance, a notion due to Bo¨rgers [1990]. An-
other approach was pursued in Marx and Swinkels [1997] (see also Marx and
Swinkels [2000]) who studied the notion of nice weak dominance, introduced
in Subsection 1.1 and denoted by NW. However, the ⇒NW reduction relation,
just as ⇒W , does not satisfy the unique normal form property. To see this
consider the following game:
L R
T 2, 1 2, 1
B 2, 1 1, 0
Clearly, all pairs of strategies are compatible, so weak dominance and nice
weak dominance coincide here. This game can be reduced by means of the
⇒NW relation both to
L R
T 2, 1 2, 1
and to
L
T 2, 1
B 2, 1
In each case we reached a ⇒NW -normal form. So the ⇒NW relation (and
consequently the ⇒W relation) is not weakly confluent and does not satisfy the
unique normal form property. Note also that the strategy L (nicely) weakly
dominates R in the original game but not in the first first restriction. This
shows that neither weak dominance nor nice weak dominance is hereditary.
A solution consists of combining nice weak dominance with the payoff
equivalence and seeking conditions under which nice weak dominance and weak
dominance coincide. This is the approach taken in Marx and Swinkels [1997]
who proved that the ⇒NW -normal forms of a game are the same up to the
removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a renaming of strategies.3 They
also observed that for the games (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) that satisfy the already
mentioned in the Introduction transference of decisionmaker indiffer-
ence (TDI) condition:
for all i, j ∈ [1..n], s′i, s
′′
i ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i
pi(s
′
i, s−i) = pi(s
′′
i , s−i) implies pj(s
′
i, s−i) = pj(s
′′
i , s−i),
(1)
nice weak dominance and weak dominance coincide on all restrictions. To see
the latter note that the compatibility is hereditary and the TDI condition sim-
ply amounts to a statement that all pairs of strategies s′i and s
′′
i are compatible.
So for the games that satisfy the TDI condition the ⇒W -normal forms of a
game are the same up to the removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a
renaming of strategies.
Marx and Swinkels [1997] also provided a number of natural examples of
games that satisfy this condition. We now present conceptually simpler proofs
of their results by following the methodology used throughout the paper. In
Section 13 we shall deal with the case of the nice weak dominance by mixed
strategies.
The following lemma summarizes the crucial properties of nice weak dom-
inance. They are ‘crucial’ in the sense that they allow us to directly apply
the already discussed Combination Theorem 10.1 to nice weak dominance and
payoff equivalence.
Lemma 11.1 (Nice Weak Dominance)
(i) NW is a strict partial order.
3Also an addition of payoff equivalent strategies is allowed. Our proof shows this is not
needed.
(ii) NW is closed under PE.
(iii) NW ∪ PE is hereditary.
Proof. (i) First, note that the relation NW is clearly irreflexive. To prove
transitivity consider a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) and suppose that s
′′
i NW s
′
i
and s′i NW s
∗
i .
Then clearly s′′i is weakly dominated by s
∗
i . To prove that s
′′
i and s
∗
i are
compatible suppose that for some s−i ∈ S−i
pi(s
′′
i , s−i) = pi(s
∗
i , s−i).
Then by the weak dominance
pi(s
′′
i , s−i) = pi(s
′
i, s−i) = pi(s
∗
i , s−i).
Hence by the compatibility of s′′i and s
′
i and the compatibility of s
′
i and s
∗
i for
all j ∈ [1..n]
pj(s
′′
i , s−i) = pj(s
′
i, s−i) = pj(s
∗
i , s−i).
(ii) The proofs of the relevant two properties of NW are analogous to the
proof of (i) and are omitted.
(iii) LetG′ := (S ′1, . . ., S
′
n, p1, . . ., pn) be a restriction ofG := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn).
Suppose s′i, s
′′
i ∈ S
′
i are such that s
′
i NW ∪ PE s
′′
i in G. Then s
′′
i and s
′
i are
compatible in G and hence in G′. Moreover
pi(s
′′
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s
∗
−i)
for all s∗
−i ∈ S
′
−i. If for some s
∗
−i ∈ S
′
−i
pi(s
′′
i , s
∗
−i) > pi(s
′
i, s
∗
−i),
then s′′i weakly dominates s
′
i in G
′ and consequently s′′i nicely weakly dominates
s′i in G
′. Otherwise
pi(s
′′
i , s
∗
−i) = pi(s
′
i, s
∗
−i)
for all s∗
−i ∈ S
′
−i, so, by the compatibility of s
′′
i and s
′
i in G
′, s′′i and s
′
i are
payoff equivalent in G′.
So we showed that s′′i NW ∪ PE s
′
i in G
′. ✷
Nice weak dominance clearly satisfies the IIIA condition of Section 4 and
by item (i) above it is a strict partial order. So using R := NW in the Inherent
Elimination Theorem 4.4 and the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 4.5 we
get the following result.
Theorem 11.2 (Inherent Nice Weak Elimination)
(i) The ⇒inh−NW relation is UN.
(ii) The ⇒inh−NW relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. ✷
Further, the above lemma in conjunction with the Payoff Equivalence Elim-
ination Theorem 8.2(i) means that for R := NW and Q := PE all assumptions
of the Combination Theorem 10.1 are satisfied. So we get the following con-
clusion.
Theorem 11.3 (Nice Weak Elimination) The ⇒NW∪PE relation is ∼-UN.
✷
Also, for games that satisfy the TDI condition (1) the ⇒NW∪PE and
⇒W∪PE relations coincide on all restrictions, so the following conclusion fol-
lows.
Corollary 11.4 (Weak Elimination) Consider a game H that satisfies the
TDI condition (1). Then the ⇒W∪PE relation is ∼-UN. ✷
To establish another form of order independence involving nice weak dom-
inance we shall rely on the following observation that refers to the crucial
concept of left commutativity.
Note 11.5 (Left Commutativity) ⇒PE left commutes with ⇒NW .
Proof. By the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 the reduction relation
⇒PE satisfies the one-at-a-time property, i.e.,
⇒+
1,PE = ⇒
+
PE.
So by the Left Commutativity Note 7.3 it suffices to show that ⇒1,PE left
commutes with ⇒NW . Suppose G⇒1,PE G
′⇒NWG
′′. In the proof below we
repeatedly use the fact that if a strategy rj is nicely weakly dominated in G
′
by a strategy tj , then so it is in G.
Let si be the strategy deleted in the first transition. If all strategies that
are payoff equivalent to si are removed in the second transition, then by the
Nice Weak Dominance Lemma 11.1(ii) NW is closed under PE which implies
G⇒NWG
′′. Consequently G⇒NW G
′′⇒ǫ1,PE G
′′.
Otherwise, by the fact that payoff equivalence is hereditary, we have
G⇒NW G1 ⇒1,PEG
′′, where G1 is obtained from G
′′ by adding si to the set of
strategies of player i. ✷
As an aside, note that the same proof shows that ⇒PE left commutes with
⇒W and with ⇒S . The relevant property is that both W and S are closed
under PE.
We reached now the already mentioned result of Marx and Swinkels [1997].
Theorem 11.6 (Structured Nice Weak Elimination) Suppose that
G⇒∗
NW
G′ and G⇒∗
NW
G′′, where both G′ and G′′ are closed under the ⇒NW
reduction (i.e., are ⇒NW -normal forms).
Then for some ∼-equivalent games H ′ and H ′′ closed under the ⇒NW∪PE
reduction we have G′⇒∗
PE
H ′ and G′′⇒∗
PE
H ′′.
Proof. Since PE is hereditary, each step H1 ⇒NW∪PE H2 can be rewritten as
H1 ⇒NW H3 ⇒PE H2 for some game H3. So by the Nice Weak Elimination
Theorem 11.3 the →1∨2 relation, where →1 := ⇒NW and →2 := ⇒PE , is
∼-UN.
It suffices now to use the Left Commutativity Note 11.5 and the Normal
Form Lemma 7.4. ✷
As explained at the end of Section 8 the reductions from G′ to H ′ and from
G′′ to H ′′ can be achieved in just one step.
Corollary 11.7 (Structured Weak Elimination) Consider a game G that
satisfies the TDI condition (1). Suppose that G⇒∗W G
′ and G⇒∗W G
′′, where
both G′ and G′′ are closed under the ⇒W reduction.
Then for some ∼-equivalent games H ′ and H ′′ we have G′⇒∗
PE
H ′ and
G′′⇒∗
PE
H ′′. ✷
Recently, Østerdal [2004] provided an alternative proof of this corollary.
In the Weak Elimination Corollary 11.4 we can weaken the assumption that
the initial gameH satisfies the TDI condition. Indeed, it suffices to ensure that
each time an ⇒W reduction can take place, it is in fact an ⇒NW reduction.
This is guaranteed if the following condition TDI+ is satisfied, given an initial
game H :
for all restrictions G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) of H ,
for all i ∈ [1..n] and ri, ti ∈ Si
if ti weakly dominates ri in G, then ri and ti are compatible in G.
An alternative, suggested by Marx and Swinkels [1997] in the context of
nice weak dominance by mixed strategies, is to use the following condition
TDI++, where, given a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), a strategy s
′
i very weakly
dominates a strategy s′′i if
pi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′′
i , s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i:
for all restrictions G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) of H ,
for all i ∈ [1..n] and ri, ti ∈ Si if ti very weakly dominates ri in G, then
either ti weakly dominates ri in G or ri and ti are payoff equivalent in G.
Indeed, it suffices to show that under the TDI++ condition all assumptions
of the Combination Theorem 10.1 are satisfied by the weak dominance relation
W . First, note that W is a strict partial order and is clearly closed under the
payoff equivalence.
Denote now the very weak dominance relation by VW . Note that
• W ⊆ VW (i.e., weak dominance implies very weak dominance),
• VW is hereditary.
Additionally, by the TDI++ assumption,
• VW ⊆W ∪ PE
holds in all restrictions of the initial game H .
This implies under the TDI++ assumption that W ∪PE is hereditary since
PE is hereditary. By the Combination Theorem 10.1 we conclude then that
the ⇒W∪PE reduction relation is ∼-UN.
The same considerations apply to the Structured Weak Elimination Corol-
lary 11.7. However, to be able to use the TDI++ condition we need in addition
to prove that ⇒PE left commutes with ⇒W . The proof is the same as that
of the Left Commutativity Note 11.5.
12 Combining Two Mixed Dominance Rela-
tions
We now return to the mixed dominance relations and study a combination
R ∪ Q of two such relations R and Q. In the applications Q will be the
randomized redundance relation PEM studied in Section 9.
We say that a combined mixed dominance relation R is closed under Q
if in all games G for all strategies r, s and all mixed strategies m1, m2
• r R m1 and s Q m2 implies r R m1[s/m2],
• r Q m1 and s R m2 implies r R m1[s/m2].
The following counterpart of the Combination Theorem 10.1 holds.
Theorem 12.1 (Combination) Consider two mixed dominance relations R
and Q such that
• ⇒R and ⇒Q are ∼-bisimilar,
• R is regular,
• R is closed under the randomized redundance,
• ⇒ 1,Q is ∼-UN,
• R ∪Q is hereditary.
Then the ⇒R∪Q relation is ∼-UN.
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of the Combination Theorem 10.1.
Since R ∪Q is hereditary, by the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2
and the ∼-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2 it suffices to prove that ⇒ 1,R∪Q
satisfies the ∼-unique normal form. In turn, by the ∼-Newman’s Lemma 7.1
this is established once we show that ⇒ 1,R∪Q is ∼-weakly confluent. Indeed,
as before ⇒ 1,R∪Q is ∼-bisimilar.
So suppose that G⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ and G⇒ 1,R∪QG
′′. Let r and s be the strate-
gies eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. By the fourth as-
sumption ⇒ 1,Q is ∼-weakly confluent, so we only need to consider a situation
when G⇒1,RG
′.
We can assume that G′ 6= G′′. Then r is in G′′ and s is in G′. By definition
r R m1 holds in G for some mixed strategy m1 of G
′ and s R ∪ Q m2 holds
in G for some mixed strategy m2 of G
′′. To show that G′′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩G′′ we
consider two cases.
Case 1. s 6∈ support(m1).
Then m1 is a mixed strategy G
′′, so r R ∪Q m1 holds in G
′′ by the hered-
itarity of R ∪Q.
Case 2. s ∈ support(m1).
If s R m2 holds in G, then, by the regularity of R, r R m1[s/m2] holds in
G.
If sQ m2 holds inG, then by the fact that R is closed under Q rR m1[s/m2]
holds in G, as well. By assumption m2 is a mixed strategy of G
′′, so s 6∈
support(m2) and consequently s 6∈ support(m1[s/m2]). So by the first clause
of the regularity condition for some mixed strategym3 with r, s 6∈ support(m3)
we have r R m3. Hence, by Case 1, r R ∪Q m1 holds in G
′′.
This proves that G′′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩ G′′. To show that G′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩ G′′ we
again consider two cases.
Case 1. r 6∈ support(m2).
Then m2 is a mixed strategy G
′, so s R ∪Q m2 holds in G
′ by the heredi-
tarity of R ∪Q.
Case 2. r ∈ support(m2).
Recall that s R ∪ Q m2 holds in G. If s R m2 holds in G, then, by the
regularity of R, s R m2[r/m1] holds in G. If s Q m2 holds in G, then by
the fact that R is closed under Q s R m2[r/m1] holds in G, as well. By
assumption m1 is a mixed strategy of G
′, so r 6∈ support(m1) and consequently
r 6∈ support(m2[r/m1]). So m2[r/m1] is a mixed strategy of G
′. This shows
G′→RG
′ ∩G′′.
By the Equivalence Lemma 5.1 the relations →R and ⇒R coincide, so
some mixed strategy m3 of G
′ ∩ G′′ exists such that s R m3 and a fortiori
s R ∪Q m3, holds in G
′.
This proves that G′⇒ 1,R∪QG
′ ∩G′′. ✷
This result can be directly applied to the combination of the elimination
by strict dominance by mixed strategies and by the randomized redundance.
Indeed, we already noticed that both mixed dominance relations are heredi-
tary, so their union is, as well. Also, we already saw that strict dominance by
means of mixed strategies is regular and it is easy to see it is closed under the
randomized redundance. So by the Redundance Elimination Theorem 9.2(i)
and the above result we can draw the following conclusions.
Theorem 12.2 (Combined Mixed Strict Elimination) The ⇒SM∪PDM
relation is ∼-UN. ✷
13 Combining NiceWeak Dominance with
Randomized Redundance
Finally, we provide a proof of another result of Marx and Swinkels [1997]
that deals with the nice weak dominance by mixed strategies. This concept
is obtained by generalizing in the obvious way the definition of nice weak
dominance to the case when the dominating strategy is mixed.
Recall from Section 6 that given a game G we write s′′i WM m
′
i when the
strategy s′′i is weakly dominated in G by the mixed strategy m
′
i. We also write
s′′i NWM m
′
i when the strategy s
′′
i is nicely weakly dominated in G by the
mixed strategy m′i, that is when s
′′
i WM m
′
i and s
′′
i and m
′
i are compatible.
As in Section 11 we summarize first the relevant properties of the nice weak
mixed dominance relation.
Lemma 13.1 (Nice Mixed Weak Dominance)
(i) NWM is regular.
(ii) NWM is closed under PEM.
(iii) NWM ∪ PEM is hereditary.
Proof. Fix a game (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn).
(i) Suppose that for some α ∈ (0, 1] and some strategy s and a mixed strategy
m of player i
s NWM (1− α)s+ α m
holds. By definition for all j ∈ [1..n] and all s−i ∈ S−i
pj((1− α)s+ α m, s−i) = (1− α)pj(s, s−i) + α pj(m, s−i),
so for all op ∈ {=, <,≤}
pj(s, s−i) op pj((1− α)s+ α m, s−i) iff pj(s, s−i) op pj(m, s−i).
This implies s NWM m.
Next, consider the strategies t1 and t2 and mixed strategies m1 and m2
of player i. For some α ∈ [0, 1] and a mixed strategy m we have m1 =
α t2 + (1− α)m. By definition for all j ∈ [1..n] and all s−i ∈ S−i
pj(m1, s−i) = α pj(t2, s−i) + (1− α)pj(m, s−i) (2)
and
pj(m1[t2/m2], s−i) = α pj(m2, s−i) + (1− α)pj(m, s−i). (3)
It is now easy to check that t1 WM m1 and t2 WM m2 implies t1 WM m1[t2/m2].
Suppose now that t1 WNM m1 and t2 WNM m2. We prove that t1 and
m1[t2/m2] are compatible. So suppose that for some i ∈ [1..n] and s−i ∈ S−i
pi(t1, s−i) = pi(m1[t2/m2], s−i).
Then by (2) and (3) and the fact that t1 WM m1 and t2 WM m2
pi(t1, s−i) = pi(m1, s−i) and pi(t2, s−i) = pi(m2, s−i).
So by the compatibility of t1 and m1 and of t2 and m2 for all j ∈ [1..n]
pj(t1, s−i) = pi(m1, s−i) and pj(t2, s−i) = pi(m2, s−i),
so again by (2) and (3)
pj(t1, s−i) = pj(m1[t2/m2], s−i).
(ii) The proofs of the relevant two properties of NWM are analogous to the
proof of (i) and are omitted.
(iii) Analogous to the proof of the Nice Weak Dominance Lemma 11.1(iii)
and omitted. ✷
We can now apply to nice weak mixed dominance the Inherent Mixed
Elimination Theorem 6.3. This way we obtain the following result.
Theorem 13.2 (Inherent Nice Weak Mixed Elimination)
(i) The ⇒inh−NWM relation is UN.
(ii) The ⇒inh−NWM relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. ✷
Further, on the account of the Redundance Elimination Theorem 9.2(i) for
R := NWM and Q := PEM all assumptions of the Combination Theorem 12.1
are satisfied. We can then draw the following conclusion.
Theorem 13.3 (Nice Weak Mixed Elimination) The ⇒NWM∪PEM rela-
tion is ∼-UN. ✷
To draw a similar conclusion for the weak dominance by mixed strategies,
as in Section 11 we provide three alternative conditions. The first one, TDIM,
is the direct counterpart of the TDI condition (1):
for all i, j ∈ [1..n], ri ∈ Si, mi ∈ Mi and s−i ∈ S−i
pi(ri, s−i) = pi(mi, s−i) implies pj(ri, s−i) = pj(mi, s−i)
Equivalently, for all i ∈ [1..n], ri ∈ Si and mi ∈Mi, ri and mi are compatible.
Indeed, the compatibility as a mixed dominance relation is hereditary, so
the TDIM condition implies that nice weak dominance and weak dominance,
both by mixed strategies, coincide on all restrictions.
The second one, TDIM+, is the counterpart of the TDI+ condition of Sec-
tion 11. Given an initial game H we postulate that
for all restrictions G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) of H ,
for all i ∈ [1..n], ri ∈ Si and mi ∈Mi
if mi weakly dominates ri in G, then ri and mi are compatible in G.
Then each time an ⇒WM reduction can take place, it is in fact an ⇒NWM
reduction. The last alternative, TDI∗, was proposed in Marx and Swinkels
[1997]. It refers to the notion of the very weak dominance introduced in
Section 11, now used as a mixed dominance relation:
for all restrictions G := (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn) of H ,
for all i ∈ [1..n], ri ∈ Si and mi ∈Mi
if mi very weakly dominates ri in G, then
either mi weakly dominates ri in G or ri and mi are payoff equivalent in G.
Then the following result holds.
Theorem 13.4 (Weak Mixed Elimination) Consider a game H that sat-
isfies the TDI ∗ condition. Then the ⇒WM∪PEM relation is ∼-UN.
Proof. We proceed as in Section 11. Denote the very weak mixed dominance
relation by VWM . Note that
• WM ⊆ VWM ,
• VWM is hereditary.
Additionally, by the TDI∗ assumption,
• VWM ⊆WM ∪ PEM
holds in all restrictions of the initial game H .
So under the TDI∗ assumption WM ∪ PEM is hereditary since PEM is
hereditary. By the Combination Theorem 12.1 we conclude that the ⇒WM∪PEM
relation is ∼-UN.
To establish another form of order independence involving nice mixed weak
dominance we need the following observation.
Note 13.5 (Left Commutativity)
(i) ⇒PEM left commutes with ⇒NWM .
(ii) ⇒PEM left commutes with ⇒WM .
Proof. (i) By the Nice Mixed Weak Dominance Lemma 13.1(ii) NWM is
closed under the randomized redundance. The rest of the proof is now analo-
gous to the proof of the Left Commutativity Note 11.5 and is omitted.
(ii) By the same argument as in (i). ✷
As in Section 11 we can now draw the following results due to Marx and
Swinkels [1997].
Theorem 13.6 (Structured Nice Weak Mixed Elimination) Suppose
that G⇒∗
NWM
G′ and G⇒∗
NWM
G′′, where both G′ and G′′ are closed under the
⇒NWM reduction.
Then for some ∼-equivalent gamesH ′ and H ′′ closed under the ⇒NWM∪PEM
reduction we have G′⇒∗
PEM
H ′ and G′′⇒∗
PEM
H ′′. ✷
Corollary 13.7 (Structured Weak Mixed Elimination) Consider a game
G that satisfies the TDI∗ condition. Suppose that G⇒∗WM G
′ and G⇒∗WM G
′′,
where both G′ and G′′ are closed under the ⇒WM reduction.
Then for some ∼-equivalent games H ′ and H ′′ closed under the ⇒WM∪PEM
reduction we have G′⇒∗
PEM
H ′ and G′′⇒∗
PEM
H ′′. ✷
14 Conclusions
In this paper we presented uniform proofs of order independence for various
strategy elimination procedures. The main ingredients of our approach were
reliance on Newman’s Lemma and related results on the abstract reduction
systems, and an analysis of the structural properties of the dominance rela-
tions. This exposition allowed us to clarify which structural properties account
for the order independence of the entailed reduction relations on the games.
In Figure 2 below we summarize the order independence results discussed
in this article. We use here the already introduced abbreviations, so:
– S denotes strict dominance,
– W denotes weak dominance,
– NW denotes nice weak dominance,
– PE denotes payoff equivalence.
Further, RM stands for the ‘mixed strategy’ version of the dominance relation
R and inh-R stands for the ‘inherent’ version of the (mixed) dominance relation
R discussed in Sections 4 and 6.
Recall also that UN stands for the uniqueness of the normal form, i.e., for
the order independence and ∼-UN is its ‘up to the game equivalence’ version.
All the results refer to the order independence of the ⇒R reduction relation
on games, introduced in Section 3.
Dominance Property Proved Result originally due to
Notion in Section
S UN 3 Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990],
Stegeman [1990]
inh−W UN 4 Bo¨rgers [1990]
inh−NW UN 11
SM UN 5 Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]
inh−WM UN 6 (Bo¨rgers [1990]: equal to SM )
inh−NWM UN 13
PE ∼-UN 8
S ∪ PE ∼-UN 10
NW ∪ PE ∼-UN 11 Marx and Swinkels [1997]
PEM ∼-UN 9
SM ∪ PEM ∼-UN 12
NWM ∪ PEM ∼-UN 13 Marx and Swinkels [1997]
Figure 2: Summary of the order independence results
The reduction relations on games that we studied are naturally related.
For example we have ⇒S ⊆ ⇒SM , with the strict inclusion for some games.
However, the respective results about these reduction relations are not related.
For example, the fact that ⇒S is UN not a special case of the fact that ⇒SM
is UN.
Indeed, given two abstract reduction systems (A, →1 ) and (A, →2 ) such
that →1 ⊆ →2 the uniqueness of a normal form with respect to →2 does not
imply the uniqueness of a normal form with respect to →1. Indeed, just take
→1 := {(a, b), (a, c)} and →2 := →1 ∪ {(b, d), (c, d)}. This example also
shows that weak confluence of →2 does not imply weak confluence of →1.
So the weak confluence of ⇒S is not a consequence of the weak confluence of
⇒SM . The same remarks apply to other pairs of dominance relations.
The provided proofs of the order independence results break down for in-
finite games. The reason is that the crucial assumption of Newman’s Lemma,
namely that that no infinite → sequences exist, does not hold then anymore.
Moreover, for infinite games the Equivalence Lemma 3.1 does not hold. Still,
it would be interesting to try to establish the main result of Dufwenberg and
Stegeman [2002] using the abstract reduction systems techniques.
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